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Evidence suggests that several elements of the climate system could be tipped into a 9 
different state by global warming, causing irreversible economic damages. To address 10 
their policy implications, we incorporated five interacting climate tipping points into a 11 
stochastic-dynamic integrated assessment model, calibrating their likelihoods and 12 
interactions on results from an existing expert elicitation. Here we show that combining 13 
realistic assumptions about policymaker’s preferences under uncertainty, with the 14 
prospect of multiple future interacting climate tipping points, increases the present 15 
social cost of carbon (SCC) in the model nearly 8-fold from $15/tCO2 to $116/tCO2. 16 
Furthermore, passing some tipping points increases the likelihood of other tipping 17 
points occurring to such an extent that it abruptly increases the social cost of carbon. 18 
The corresponding optimal policy involves an immediate, massive effort to control CO2 19 
emissions, which are stopped by mid-century, leading to climate stabilization at <1.5 °C 20 
warming above pre-industrial levels.  21 
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The social cost of carbon (SCC) represents the cost of all future climate damages stemming 22 
from a marginal emission of CO2, discounted to the year of emission. The 2010 US Federal 23 
assessment
1
 used three simple integrated assessment models (IAMs) to arrive at a SCC of 24 
$21/tCO2 for a tonne emitted in 2010, which was subsequently revised upwards
2
 to $33/tCO2. 25 
Several other studies
3-6
 have argued for a higher SCC on various grounds. A key potential 26 
contributor to increasing the SCC is the possibility that ongoing climate change will cause 27 
elements of the climate system to pass ‘tipping points’ leading to irreversible damages7,8.  28 
Existing scientific studies suggest there are multiple climate tipping points that could be 29 
triggered this century or next if climate change continues unabated
7,8
, and there are causal 30 
interactions between tipping events such that tipping one element affects the likelihoods of 31 
tipping others
8
 (Fig. 1). The likelihood of specific tipping events varies, but is generally 32 
expected to increase with global temperature
7,8
. However, internal variability within the 33 
climate system, and relatively rapid anthropogenic forcing, mean that even if deterministic 34 
tipping points could be precisely identified, the actual systems could be tipped earlier or 35 
later
9
. Thus, any assessment of their policy implications needs to represent the stochastic 36 
uncertainty surrounding when tipping points could occur
10
. Furthermore, the impacts of 37 
passing different tipping points are expected to vary
7,11
, and to unfold at different rates 38 
depending on the internal timescale of the part of the climate system being tipped
7,11
.     39 
Relative to this scientific understanding, most cost-benefit analyses of climate change only 40 
allow for simple and scientifically unrealistic representations of climate tipping points
11
. 41 
Most previous IAM studies of climate catastrophes have treated them in a deterministic 42 
fashion, sometimes giving them a probability distribution
5,12-15
. Some recent IAM studies 43 
have considered one stochastic climate tipping point impacting economic output
10
, non-44 
market welfare
16
, climate sensitivity
17
, or carbon cycle feedbacks
17
. This can lead to up to 45 
200% increases in the SCC in extreme cases
10
, with the results clearly sensitive to the 46 
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timescale over which tipping point impacts unfold, as well as the final magnitude of those 47 
impacts
10
. However, there has been little consideration of multiple tipping points and 48 
interactions between them, or of how an appropriate representation of risk aversion affects 49 
the optimal response to the prospect of future tipping points.  50 
A recent IAM study
18
 has examined three loosely-defined tipping points that instantaneously 51 
alter climate sensitivity, carbon cycle feedbacks, or economic output, and interact via their 52 
effects on atmospheric CO2, global temperature, or economic output. Here we consider five 53 
carefully-defined tipping points
7,8
 and the direct causal interactions between them identified 54 
by scientific experts
8
 (Fig. 1). These interactions occur primarily via aspects of the climate 55 
system that are not resolved in simple IAMs. The impacts of our tipping points unfold at a 56 
rate appropriate for the system being tipped, in contrast with instantaneous changes
17,18
 in 57 
climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedbacks which are scientifically questionable
10
. Our 58 
tipping points principally affect economic output, although we also consider their feedback 59 
effects on the carbon cycle. Instead of arbitrarily specifying the likelihood of the tipping 60 
points
18
 we calibrate their likelihoods (and the causal interactions between them) based on the 61 
results of an existing expert elicitation
8
. Furthermore, in contrast to recent work
18
, we alter 62 
the specification of the social planner’s preferences regarding risk aversion and 63 
intergenerational equity, in a manner appropriate for the stochastic uncertainty surrounding 64 
future tipping points.  65 
 66 
Modelling tipping points 67 
We use the dynamic stochastic integration of climate and economy (DSICE) framework
19
 to 68 
incorporate five stochastic tipping points and causal interactions between them into the 2013 69 
version of the well-known DICE model
20
 (see Methods, Supplementary Figs. 1,2). This 70 
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means solving a 16-dimensional stochastic model – the first time in the field of economics of 71 
climate change that an analysis on such a scale has been accomplished (our previous work
10
 72 
solved a 7-dimensional system, whereas other simplified stochastic versions
17
 of DICE only 73 
consider 4 dimensions). In our stochastic version of the DICE model, we use annual time 74 
steps, and calibrate parameters in the carbon cycle and temperature modules against the 75 
emulated median response of complex climate models for the four RCP (representative 76 
concentration pathway) scenarios
21
 (see Supplementary Methods). In a deterministic setting 77 
within our model (without considering climate tipping points) our calibration gives a social 78 
cost of carbon in 2010 of $15/tCO2 (all results are in 2010 US dollars). For reference, 79 
Nordhaus’ DICE-2013R model20 which uses five-year time steps and is calibrated against one 80 
RCP scenario also has a 2010 SCC of $15/tCO2.  81 
In IAMs such as DICE, greater emission control at present mitigates damages from climate 82 
change in the future but limits consumption and/or capital investment today. A ‘social 83 
planner’ is assumed to weigh these costs and benefits of emission control to maximize the 84 
expected present value of global social welfare. When faced with stochastic uncertainty about 85 
future tipping events, the social planner’s response will depend on their preferences regarding 86 
risk and smoothing consumption. DICE adopts a specification of risk aversion that is 87 
inversely tied to the decision maker’s preferences to smooth consumption over time (i.e. the 88 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution). Thus, a high inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 89 
is taken to imply a low risk aversion. In the baseline DICE model, risk aversion RA=1.45, 90 
and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution IES=1/1.45. However, empirical economic data 91 
do not support this inverse proportionality (implying time separable utility) and suggest 92 
instead decoupling these preferences
22
. Hence we incorporated ‘Epstein-Zin’ (EZ) 93 
preferences
22
 using default parameter settings
23
 of RA=3.066 and IES=1.5, which are 94 
consistent with empirical findings
23
 (implying time non-separable utility). Estimates of IES>1 95 
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have been obtained from e.g. stockholder data
24
, IES=1.5 is used in a long-run risk model
19,25
, 96 
and the upper bound is considered
23
 to be IES ~2. Using IES=1.5, equity returns data
23
 97 
suggest RA=3.066, which is in the range RA=3-4 from a separate study of equity premiums 98 
of rare disasters
26
, with the upper bound considered
25
 to be RA~10.  99 
The five interacting, stochastic, potential climate tipping points
7,8
 (Fig. 1, Table 1) represent 100 
reorganisation of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), disintegration of 101 
the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS), collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS), dieback of 102 
the Amazon rainforest (AMAZ), and shift to a more persistent El-Niño regime (ENSO). We 103 
used published expert elicitation results
8
 to derive the likelihoods (see Methods) of each of 104 
the five tipping events (Table 1), and the causal interactions between them (Fig. 1, 105 
Supplementary Table 1). By causal interaction we mean that the hazard rate of each tipping 106 
point depends on the state of the others.  107 
For each tipping event we specified a transition timescale
10
 (Table 1, see Methods) – i.e. how 108 
long it would take for the full impacts to unfold, based on current scientific understanding of 109 
the timescales of the systems being tipped
7,11
 (e.g. ice sheets melt more slowly than the ocean 110 
circulation can reorganise). Recognising the scientific uncertainty surrounding transition 111 
times we explore a factor of 5 uncertainty range in either direction. We must also specify a 112 
final damage for each tipping event (Table 1, see Methods), taken to be an irreversible 113 
percentage reduction in world GDP. This is the most problematic and debatable part of the 114 
parameterisation, because of a gross shortage of scientific and economic estimates of tipping 115 
point damages
11
. We can make some scientific inferences about relative damages (e.g. based 116 
on the eventual contributions of different ice sheets to sea-level rise).  Past studies with DICE 117 
have loosely associated a 25-30% reduction in GDP comparable with the Great Depression 118 
with a collapse of the AMOC
27,28
, but when combined with other tipping points this could 119 
lead to excessively high overall damages.  Our assigned damages for individual tipping points 120 
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range from 5-15% reduction in GDP with a combined reduction in GDP if all five tipping 121 
events occur and complete their transitions of 38%. However, due to relatively low 122 
probabilities and long transition timescales, the expected tipping point damages in our default 123 
scenario only amount to 0.53% of GDP in 2100 and 1.89% of GDP in 2200. In our sensitivity 124 
analysis we consider a factor of 2-3 total uncertainty range in final damages for each tipping 125 
point. Finally, we include some conservative effects of tipping particular systems on the 126 
carbon cycle (Table 1, see Methods).  127 
 128 
Optimal policy 129 
The result of including multiple interacting tipping points under EZ preferences (Fig. 2) is a 130 
nearly 8-fold increase in the initial social cost of carbon from $15/tCO2 in the baseline model 131 
(grey line) to $116/tCO2 (black line). Across 10,000 sample paths of the model there are 132 
cases where one or more tipping points still occur, leading to uncertainty ranges for the key 133 
variables (grey shaded areas). The emissions control rate jumps from ~18% to ~56% in 2010 134 
and rises to 100% by 2050, effectively shutting down fossil fuel CO2 emissions – whereas in 135 
the baseline model emissions continue into the next the century. The average atmospheric 136 
carbon peaks in the 2030s at 415 ppm and then declines (due to ongoing ocean carbon 137 
uptake) – whereas in the baseline model atmospheric CO2 continues to rise to ~650 ppm by 138 
2100. Temperature rise slows down and is almost stable around 1.4 °C above pre-industrial 139 
by 2100 – whereas in the baseline model warming continues and approaches 3 °C by 2100. 140 
Following the expected path (black line) there is only an 11% probability of one or more 141 
tipping events by 2100, reduced from 46% in the baseline model, or 87% under a prescribed 142 
RCP8.5 emissions scenario (Table 2).  143 
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A factor of 2.4 increase from the baseline SCC to $36/tCO2 is just due to the change to EZ 144 
preferences (dashed black line, Fig. 2), with a further factor of 3.2 increase due to the 145 
potential for multiple tipping points. With just EZ preferences (and no stochastic tipping 146 
points) the initial emissions control rate increases from ~18% to ~29% with 100% emissions 147 
control in 2100. Atmospheric carbon peaks around 550 ppm, with surface temperature 148 
stabilising around 2.3 °C above pre-industrial.  149 
 150 
Tipping point interactions 151 
In the full model, there are both positive and negative causal interactions between tipping 152 
points (Fig. 1, Supplementary Table 1), which are conservatively calibrated (see Methods). 153 
Hence their inclusion has only a modest net effect on the expected SCC, increasing it from 154 
$109/tCO2 to $116/tCO2 (see also Supplementary Fig. 3). However, a specific sample path 155 
where multiple tipping events occur before 2200 (Fig. 3, solid line) reveals that some tipping 156 
point interactions can have a strong effect on the time evolution of the SCC. Considering a no 157 
interactions sample path (Fig. 3, dashed line) shows that in general, passing a tipping point 158 
reduces the incentive to mitigate and therefore lowers the SCC, because it can no longer be 159 
avoided. However, with interactions, tipping of the GIS significantly increases the likelihood 160 
of AMOC tipping (which is assumed to be the most damaging event) hence this causes a 161 
large increase in the SCC in order to try to avoid AMOC tipping. (This is consistent with 162 
previous suggestions
29,30
 that tipping points can create multiple optima – here for the SCC 163 
and corresponding emissions
30
.) Subsequent tipping of AMOC greatly reduces the SCC. 164 
Tipping of ENSO causes a small increase in the SCC because it increases the likelihood of 165 
tipping the Amazon. Subsequent tipping of the Amazon halves the SCC because there is now 166 
an unavoidable extra source of carbon to the atmosphere and only WAIS left to tip. There are 167 
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other sample paths where the first tipping event does not increase the likelihood of others so 168 
the SCC drops – e.g. when the Amazon rainforest tips first (Supplementary Fig. 4). 169 
The social cost of carbon therefore depends on whether tipping events occur and in which 170 
order. This can also be seen by looking at the sample paths for the earliest and sole tipping 171 
before 2100 of each element (Supplementary Fig. 5). If the GIS tips first this leads to the 172 
highest SCC path and the most stringent emission control, reaching 100% before 2040, 173 
because of the increased risk of AMOC collapse. If the AMOC tips first, this gives the lowest 174 
SCC path because it has the greatest damages, which can no longer be avoided – yet emission 175 
control remains above 60% and the SCC remains above $110/tCO2. If the Amazon tips first, 176 
this also lowers SCC and emission control, but it leads to the highest atmospheric carbon and 177 
temperature trajectory because of an accompanying carbon source. If ENSO tips first, this 178 
slightly increases emission control because the likelihood of the AMAZ tipping is increased. 179 
If the WAIS tips first, there is little effect on emission control because it only slightly 180 
increases the likelihood of tipping the AMOC and GIS. CO2 emissions trajectories 181 
(Supplementary Fig. 6) therefore depend on the contemporaneous state of tipping elements. 182 
 183 
Sensitivity analysis 184 
The high social cost of carbon is robust to sensitivity analyses (see Methods). Combined 185 
variations in assumed transition times and final damages of the tipping points give a full 186 
range in initial SCC of $50-166/tCO2 (Supplementary Table 2). With pessimistic settings for 187 
the expert assessment of interactions between tipping elements (Supplementary Table 3), the 188 
SCC increases from $116/tCO2 to $121/tCO2. Including an endogenous transition time for the 189 
GIS gives only a slight reduction in SCC to $114/tCO2 because its damages tend to be 190 
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discounted away anyway. Allowing all tipping elements to have an endogenous transition 191 
time reduces SCC to $94/tCO2. 192 
Retaining an intertemporal elasticity of substitution IES=1.5 but increasing risk aversion to 193 
RA=10 increases the SCC from $116/tCO2 to $146/tCO2. With the original RA=3.066 and an 194 
upper limit of IES=2 the SCC increases to $151/tCO2. Using the default DICE settings of 195 
IES=1/1.45 and RA=1.45 gives an SCC of $28/tCO2, a factor 1.9 increase from the default 196 
$15/tCO2 due to the five interacting tipping points. Thus, EZ preferences magnify the effect 197 
of including potential future tipping points, causing a factor 3.2 (rather than 1.9) increase in 198 
the SCC. To disentangle the effect of IES and RA, we also investigate a case with IES=1.5 199 
and RA=1/1.5, which gives an SCC of $104/tCO2. That is, when we incorporate the climate 200 
tipping risks, using time separable preferences as in DICE, an increase from IES=1/1.45 (and 201 
RA=1.45) to IES=1.5 (and RA=1/1.5) leads to a factor 3.7 increase in the SCC, and the 202 
additional change to our default time non-separable EZ preferences (IES=1.5, RA=3.066) 203 
leads to an extra SCC of $12/tCO2. 204 
 205 
Discussion and conclusion 206 
Putting our results in scientific context, there is already evidence that major ice sheets are 207 
losing mass at an accelerating rate
31,32
. GIS mass loss is estimated to be contributing ~0.7 208 
mm/yr to sea-level rise
33
, with a corresponding increase in freshwater flux to the North 209 
Atlantic
34
 since 1990 of ~0.01 Sv. Although modest at present, this and other contributors to 210 
increasing freshwater input to the North Atlantic
35
, are thought
8
 to increase the likelihood of 211 
AMOC tipping, and our results suggest this should be increasing the incentive to control CO2 212 
emissions. WAIS mass loss is contributing ~0.35 mm/yr to sea-level rise
32
, and there is 213 
evidence that parts of the West Antarctic ice sheet are already in irreversible retreat
36-38
. If the 214 
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WAIS has already passed a tipping point then mitigation cannot avoid it, but our results 215 
suggest this should not significantly reduce the incentive to mitigate to try to avoid other 216 
tipping events. 217 
Our results and policy recommendations differ considerably from another recent study 218 
considering multiple tipping points
18
, which recommends at most a doubling of the social 219 
cost of carbon (SCC) that allows CO2 emissions to continue to grow past mid-century, with 220 
temperature ultimately peaking at just under 3 °C. In contrast, our results recommend a 221 
nearly 8-fold increase in the SCC to drive a cessation of CO2 emissions by mid-century, 222 
which limits warming to <1.5 °C. This very different outcome is a result of our different 223 
specification of tipping points together with our change in decision maker preferences to 224 
something more appropriate for such stochastic climate risks. 225 
There are several caveats with the DICE modelling approach used here (and the simplified 226 
version of DICE used elsewhere
18
). In the climate component of the model, the ocean carbon 227 
sink is too strong
39
, causing it to overestimate the effect of emissions reductions on 228 
atmospheric CO2 and temperature, especially beyond 2100. We only consider one value for 229 
equilibrium climate sensitivity (2.9 °C following DICE-2013), whereas the IPCC likely 230 
range
40
 spans 1.5-4.5 °C. Nevertheless, the DICE prediction that a shut-down of CO2 231 
emissions by mid-century will lead to ~1.5 °C warming, is compatible with more detailed 232 
probabilistic projections
41,42
 varying climate sensitivity (noting that DICE shuts down 233 
emission faster but then does not allow for net carbon dioxide removal in the second half of 234 
this century
41,42
).  235 
The economic component of DICE allows for an unrealistic instantaneous adjustment of 236 
emissions (to e.g. a control rate >0.5), whereas in reality emissions control rates are low and 237 
there are lags in ramping them up, for example due to the lifetime of coal-fired power 238 
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stations. However, recent energy-economic model studies
41,42
 show that it is technologically 239 
feasible to increase the emissions control rate to 100%, and thus achieve net zero CO2 240 
emissions, by mid-century. The assumed costs of mitigation options in DICE are also 241 
relatively low
43
, whereas energy-economic models
41
 indicate that limiting warming to 1.5 °C 242 
would be considerably more expensive than limiting it to 2 °C, especially between now and 243 
2030. Despite these uncertainties, in a real options analysis framework
44
, paying up front now 244 
to minimise the future risk of climate tipping points can still be the logical and cost-effective 245 
option for societies. Furthermore, acknowledging that society also faces other potential 246 
tipping points (e.g. disease pandemics) should increase the willingness to pay to avert any 247 
one of them
45
, even though we should not necessarily avert all of them
45
. The decision to try 248 
to avert climate tipping points depends crucially on a relatively high risk aversion
45
, 249 
consistent with our findings.  250 
In summary, our results illustrate that the prospect of multiple interacting climate tipping 251 
points with irreversible economic damages ought to be provoking very strong mitigation 252 
action, on the part of ‘social planners’ – including governments signed up to the United 253 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Under realistic preferences under 254 
uncertainty, the optimal policy involves a shutdown of carbon emissions by mid-century.  255 
 256 
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Figure legends 383 
 384 
Figure 1. Map of the five climate tipping events considered here and the causal interactions 385 
between them previously identified in an expert elicitation
8
.  386 
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 387 
Figure 2. Results for: (a) the social cost of carbon, (b) emissions control policy, (c) 388 
atmospheric carbon (ppm), and (d) surface temperature change (above pre-industrial), in the 389 
baseline deterministic model (grey), the deterministic model with Epstein-Zin preferences 390 
(dashed black), and the expected path of stochastic model with multiple interacting tipping 391 
points (black). The grey-shaded area shows the range of sample paths from 10,000 392 
simulations of the stochastic model (see Supplementary Figure 3 for the analogous case 393 
without interaction). 394 
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 395 
Figure 3. Example sample paths of the social cost of carbon (SCC) in $/tCO2 with multiple 396 
tipping points interacting (solid line) and not interacting (dashed line) to highlight the effect 397 
of causal interactions between tipping events. 398 
  399 
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Tables 400 
 401 
Table 1. Hazard rate, transition time, final damages and carbon cycle effect for each tipping 402 
element, with uncertainty ranges (in parentheses) considered in the sensitivity analysis. 403 
Tipping 
element 
Hazard rate 
(%/yr/K) 
Transition time 
(years) 
Final damages 
(% GDP) 
Carbon cycle effect 
AMOC 0.063 50 (10-250) 15 (10-20) No effect 
GIS 0.188 1500 (300-7500) 10 (5-15) 100 GtC over transition 
WAIS 0.104 500 (100-2500) 5 (2.5-7.5) 100 GtC over transition 
AMAZ 0.163 50 (10-250) 5 (2.5-7.5) 50 GtC over transition 
ENSO 0.053 50 (10-250) 10 (5-15) 0.2 GtC/yr permanent 
 404 
 405 
  406 
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Table 2. Expected tipping point probabilities (%) by years 2100 and 2200, based on 10,000 407 
model runs of the DSICE model
19
 with five stochastic tipping points, and those that would be 408 
obtained from the temperature paths in the deterministic baseline model without tipping 409 
points, or under prescribed RCP 8.5 emissions. 410 
*2.8 °C warming in 2100, 2.76 °C in 2200 411 
**4.7 °C warming in 2100, 7.5 °C in 2200 412 
 413 
  414 
Number of 
tipping 
events 
Stochastic  
tipping points 
(interacting) 
Stochastic  
tipping points 
(no interaction) 
Baseline model 
temperature 
path* 
RCP8.5 
temperature 
path** 
2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200 2100 2200 
1 10.8 24.38 12.04 26.88 34.28 23.03 29.69 0 
2 0.65 4.14 0.72 4.08 10.03 31.31 30.73 0 
3 0.04 0.42 0.05 0.41 1.81 24.7 19.08 0.33 
4 0 0.02 0 0.02 0.18 10.1 6.76 16.87 
5 0 0.01 0 0 0 2.29 0.85 82.80 
Cumulative 
probability 
11.49 28.97 12.81 31.39 46.30 91.43 87.11 100 
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Methods 415 
Summary 416 
We use the DSICE model
10,19 
 (Supplementary Fig. 1) to compute the socially optimal 417 
reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions under the possibility of five interacting climate 418 
tipping points. The baseline deterministic model without tipping points is based on the 2013 419 
version of DICE
20
, but uses parameters in the carbon cycle and temperature system calibrated 420 
against all four RCP scenarios (see Supplementary Methods), and solves on an annual time 421 
step. DICE comprises one state variable for the capital stock, representing the world 422 
economy, a three-box carbon cycle module, and a two-box climate. To this we add a 10-423 
dimensional system of interacting tipping elements.  424 
For each of five tipping elements we have a discrete binary state indicating whether its 425 
corresponding tipping process has been already triggered or not, and a continuous state 426 
variable indicating the contemporaneous length of the transition process. The occurrence of 427 
each climate tipping point is modeled by a Markov process and its timing is not known at the 428 
times of decisions. The endogenous hazard rate (/yr/K) for each tipping event is assumed zero 429 
up to 1 °C warming above pre-industrial levels (reached in about 2015 in the model) and 430 
increases linearly with global warming above 1 °C at a rate derived from published expert 431 
elicitation results
8
. The conditional probabilities representing changes to the other hazard 432 
rates should a particular system tip are conservatively specified given wide ranges in the 433 
expert assessment
8
. The transition timescale
10
 of each tipping element is based on current 434 
scientific understanding of the timescales at which specific climate subsystems can transition 435 
into an alternative state, with a factor of 5 uncertainty range in either direction considered in 436 
the sensitivity analysis. Tipping points are assumed to directly impact economic output and 437 
their relative final damages are based on scientific understanding. The absolute final damages 438 
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of individual tipping events are highly uncertain and are varied in the sensitivity analysis over 439 
a factor of 2-3 range, giving a range in total reduction in GDP if all five tipping events occur 440 
of 23%-50%. In addition to the impacts of tipping points on economic output we also include 441 
conservative effects of tipping particular systems on the carbon cycle, implemented as 442 
exogenous emissions to the atmosphere. The stochastic model is solved using a 443 
supercomputer
19,46
, to generate 10,000 stochastic sample paths, with the expected path 444 
calculated as the average of all paths.   445 
In the following, we detail the specific modifications to the DICE-2013R model and refer to 446 
Nordhaus
43
 for calibration and formulations of the remaining parts of the model.  447 
 448 
Calibration of tipping elements and interactions between them 449 
As in previous work
10
 we define three phases to the tipping process for each tipping element 450 
(Supplementary Fig. 2). In the first, pre-trigger phase, the additional damage from a tipping 451 
point is 0. In the second, transition phase, there is a positive, but not stationary additional 452 
damage level. In the third and final, post-tipping phase the tipping element is in a new, 453 
absorbing state, with a constant (irreversible) damage level. 454 
For each tipping element, 𝑖, after a tipping point is passed, a persistent climate impact state, 455 
the additional damage factor 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 will increase continuously from a minimal level (i.e., 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 =456 
0) to some maximum level (𝐽𝑖 > 0), implying that 𝐽𝑖,𝑡+1 = min {𝐽𝑖,𝑡 + Δ𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐽𝑖}𝐼𝑖,𝑡, where Δ𝑖,𝑡   is 457 
the incremental impact level from stage 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1 of tipping element 𝑖 . In our default case, 458 
Δ𝑖,𝑡 denotes linear increments, but these increments become nonlinear in the sensitivity case 459 
with endogenous transition time. We use 𝐼𝑖,𝑡  as the indicator function to denote for each 460 
tipping element 𝑖 the pre-trigger state of the world as 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 0 and the post-trigger state of the 461 
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world as 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 1, where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is a jump process with a Markovian hazard rate. The latter is 462 
endogenous with respect to the contemporaneous level of global average atmospheric 463 
temperature, 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇. Furthermore, to model causal relationships between the tipping elements 464 
the Markovian hazard rate for tipping element 𝑖 also depends on whether a tipping process of 465 
climate tipping element 𝑗 has been triggered. We do not explicitly consider other indicators 466 
for tipping, e.g., the gradient of temperature
47
. The transition function for 𝐼𝑖,𝑡  from stage 𝑡 to 467 
stage 𝑡 + 1 is 𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑔𝑖
𝐼(𝑰𝒕, 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 , 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝐼 ) , where 𝑰𝒕 is the vector of the indicator functions for 468 
the five climate tipping elements (𝐼1,𝑡, … , 𝐼5,𝑡)  and 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝐼  is a random process. With 𝐽𝑖,𝑡+1 =469 
min{ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 +  Δ𝑖,𝑡, 𝐽𝑖}𝐼𝑖,𝑡 the impact factor on the economy becomes  470 
Ω𝑡(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 , 𝑱𝒕, 𝑰𝒕) =
∏ (1−𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝐽𝑖,𝑡𝑖 )
1+𝜋2(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇)
2      (1) 471 
where 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇  is the average global atmospheric temperature and 𝜋2  is a coefficient in the 472 
damage function. (The impact of global warming on the economy is reflected by a convex 473 
damage function of atmospheric temperature, which is a standard feature of the DICE model 474 
– a deterministic model specification would simply be to fix all 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 at 0.) We specify the 475 
probability transition matrix of the tipping process 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as 476 
[
1 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
0 1
]     (2) 477 
where its (𝑛, 𝑚) element is the transition probability from state 𝑛 to 𝑚 for 𝐼𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 1 −478 
exp (−𝐵𝑖(𝑰) max{0, 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 − 1}), where 𝐵𝑖(𝑰) is the hazard rate function for tipping element 𝑖, 479 
depending on whether other tipping elements have tipped. A general formula for the hazard 480 
rate function is given by 481 
𝐵𝑖(𝑰) = 𝑏𝑖 ∙ (1 + ∑ (𝐼𝑗 ∙ 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑗 )).     (3) 482 
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We calibrated the values for 𝑏𝑖 using the expert opinions reported in Kriegler et al.
8
 and our 483 
previously described methodology
10
. Specifically, we calibrated 𝑏𝑖  to match the average 484 
expert’s cumulative trigger probabilities for each tipping element by the year 2200 for the 485 
medium temperature corridor in Kriegler et al.
8
, which implies 2.5 °C warming in 2100 and 3 486 
°C warming in 2200. These probabilities are 22% for AMOC, 52% for GIS, 34% for WAIS, 487 
48% for AMAZ and 19% for ENSO. The corresponding values for 𝑏𝑖  are 𝑏𝐴𝑀𝑂𝐶  = 488 
0.00063064, 𝑏𝐺𝐼𝑆  = 0.00188445, 𝑏𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑆 = 0.00103854, 𝑏𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑍  = 0.00163443 and 𝑏𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑂  = 489 
0.000526678 (Table 1). 490 
To model the interaction component of tipping point likelihood, we introduce 𝑓𝑖𝑗  as an 491 
additional probability factor, which describes by how much the hazard factor for tipping 492 
element 𝑗 is affected if tipping element 𝑖 has tipped (when it is negative, it implies a decrease 493 
in probability). The parameter matrix 𝑓𝑖𝑗  is calibrated for 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ { AMOC, GIS, WAIS, 494 
AMAZ, ENSO}. Again we use the results in Kriegler et al.
8
 as the source for our calibration 495 
of the interaction effects between tipping elements. In particular, we consider the core 496 
experts’ assessment of the interaction effects for the “medium” temperature corridor. Our aim 497 
is to implement the interactions as direct, conditional alterations to the hazard rate of 498 
individual tipping events. Supplementary Table 1 summarizes our calibrated factors, 𝑓𝑖𝑗 . For 499 
some of the interaction effects, experts assessed ambiguous effects. For example, in the case 500 
of WAIS affecting AMOC the interaction factor ranges between <0 and >0 among the 501 
experts and among the average optimistic and pessimistic opinions of the core experts. In 502 
such an ambiguous case, while it might be worthwhile incorporating this uncertainty in the 503 
direction of interaction, we leave that as a possible avenue for further research and focus 504 
here, as in the non-ambiguous cases, solely on the average core experts’ assessment. 505 
 
 
26 
 
The order of the tipping sequence is important for the overall impact of any individual tipping 506 
element, due to asymmetric causal relationships between some of the tipping events (Fig. 1, 507 
Supplementary Table 1). For example, when GIS tipping is triggered first, the likelihood of 508 
AMOC is increased, but if instead a tipping point in the AMOC is triggered first, the 509 
likelihood of GIS tipping is reduced. 510 
 511 
Specification of transition times, final damages, and carbon cycle effects 512 
In addition to calibrating the hazard rate (described above), we have to specify the transition 513 
time, final damage levels and the effect on the carbon cycle for each tipping element (Table 514 
1). We base this on reviews of the literature, updated from previous work
7,11
. Recognising the 515 
scientific and economic uncertainties in these choices, the transition times are given a 516 
common factor of 5 range of uncertainty in either direction from default values, and the final 517 
damages are given a factor of 2-3 total uncertainty range. The values chosen are briefly 518 
justified as follows: 519 
AMOC: Past abrupt climate changes linked to reorganisations of the AMOC have occurred in 520 
a decade or less, but future AMOC collapse in model simulations can take a couple of 521 
centuries. Hence we opt for a 50-year default transition time and 10-250 year range. The 522 
AMOC collapse is often viewed as the archetype of a climate catastrophe; hence we assign it 523 
the highest final damage (accepting that others will question this). Past studies with DICE 524 
have suggested a collapse of the AMOC might result in a 25-30% reduction in GDP 525 
comparable with the Great Depression
27,28
. However, when combined with other tipping 526 
events this could lead to excessively high damages, so we opt for a 15% GDP reduction with a 527 
range of 10-20%. We considered the potential for the AMOC collapse to reduce both ocean 528 
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heat
48
 and carbon
49,50
 uptake. However quantitative estimates of these effects based on 529 
existing studies
48-50
 suggest they are small, hence they are ignored here. 530 
GIS: Irreversible meltdown of the Greenland ice sheet typically takes millennia in model 531 
simulations
51,52
, but models are unable to explain the speed of recent ice loss
7
. To cover the 532 
uncertainty we opt for a default timescale of 1500 years, with a minimum timescale
7
 of 300 533 
years and an upper limit of 7500 years. The final damages from the GIS melt will largely be 534 
due to sea-level rise
7
 of around 7 metres, which is roughly twice what can come from WAIS 535 
disintegration
53
. Hence we give the GIS twice the default final damages of the WAIS, noting 536 
that the spatial pattern of sea level rise will be greatest furthest away from each ice sheet (due 537 
to gravitational effects). As well as flooding low-lying cities and agricultural land, flooding of 538 
large areas of low-lying permafrost (especially in Siberia) could ultimately release large 539 
amounts of carbon
11
. We conservatively assume an exogenous emission of 100 GtC over the 540 
duration of the transition, which is only ~6% of the total permafrost carbon reservoir
54
.  541 
WAIS: The West Antarctic ice sheet is grounded largely below sea level and has the potential 542 
for more rapid disintegration than the Greenland ice sheet
7
, ultimately leading to up to 3.3 543 
metres sea-level rise
53
. Past sea-level rise in the penultimate Eemian inter-glacial period is 544 
estimated to have occurred
55
 at rates >1 m/century and must have come from Antarctica 545 
and/or Greenland. We assign a minimum timescale of 100 years for WAIS disintegration, 546 
with a default setting of 500 years, and an upper limit of 2500 years. Noting that the effect of 547 
GIS meltdown on Arctic sea level is greatly suppressed by gravitational adjustment
56
, 548 
whereas that of WAIS disintegration is not
53
, we assign WAIS the same potential to release 549 
100 GtC from low-lying permafrost over the duration of the transition.  550 
AMAZ: Dieback of the Amazon rainforest in future model simulations
57
 takes around 50 551 
years, which we use as our default. However, if drought and corresponding fires respond very 552 
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non-linearly to climate change
58
 dieback could conceivably occur on a minimum timescale of 553 
10 years, whereas if the forest is more resilient it could take centuries, consistent with a 554 
maximum timescale of 250 years. The Amazon rainforest is estimated to store 150-200 GtC 555 
in living biomass and soils
59
 and we conservatively assume that dieback will release 50 GtC 556 
over the duration of the transition.   557 
ENSO: In the past the frequency and amplitude of ENSO variability has changed on decadal 558 
to centennial timescales
7
, and in the future the amplitude of ENSO variability is expected to 559 
increase with more frequent extreme El Niño and extreme La Niña events
60
. Past El Niño and 560 
La Niña events have had large impacts, especially on the agricultural sector, and their more 561 
global footprint than Amazon dieback leads us to assign higher damages to ENSO. The 562 
observational record shows that individual strong El Niño events can cause anomalous 563 
emissions of carbon by fire
61
 of ~2 GtC. Hence we assume that an increase in El Niño 564 
amplitude could readily cause an average increase in land carbon emissions (exogenous) by 565 
0.2 GtC/yr that is essentially permanent on the timescale of our integrations.  566 
The combined effect on final damages if all tipping points occur is 38%, with a 23%-50% 567 
range in our sensitivity analysis. However, the timescale for all damages to be felt in our 568 
default case is over 1000 years, and our tipping probabilities are relatively low. Only two 569 
tipping elements (GIS, AMAZ) have an expected tipping time around 2200 (when it is as 570 
likely as not that their tipping process will be triggered), with the remaining three elements 571 
being less likely to tip. Furthermore, slow transition times mean that damages tend to be 572 
discounted away. As we have shown previously
10
, a tipping point with 2.5% damage to GDP 573 
and a 5 year transition time will have much larger impact on the SCC today than a tipping 574 
point with 25% damage to GDP and a 500 year transition time. Other integrated assessment 575 
model studies that treat tipping points have tended to assume instantaneous transitions and 576 
double-digit percentage damages. Thus, we argue that overall our model is conservatively 577 
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calibrated with relatively low expected damages, which amount to 0.53% of GDP in 2100 578 
and 1.89% of GDP in 2200 in our default model parameterization. 579 
The couplings to the carbon cycle lead to the following new specification of the exogenous 580 
land carbon source (in GtC) in DSICE:  581 
                                                 𝐸𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑,𝑡 = 0.9𝑒
−0.04𝑡  +𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑆 ⋅ 𝐼_{𝐽𝐺𝐼𝑆 < 𝐽𝐺𝐼𝑆} ⋅
100
1500
   582 
                                                                              +𝐼𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑆 ⋅ 𝐼_{𝐽𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑆 < 𝐽𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑆} ⋅
100
500
   583 
                 +𝐼𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑍 ⋅ 𝐼_{𝐽𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑍 < 𝐽𝐴𝑀𝐴𝑍}  ⋅
50
50
    584 
                                                                                   +0.2 ( 𝐽𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑂 𝐽𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑂⁄ ) ,   (4) 585 
where the first term on the right hand side is from the DICE model and all remaining terms 586 
are our modifications. Here, 𝐼_{} serves as an indicator function. 587 
 588 
The Dynamic Programming Problem 589 
In the following we present the dynamic programming problem of the social planner: 590 
𝑉𝑡(𝓢)  =    max
𝐶𝑡,𝜇𝑡
 𝑢(𝐶𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) +𝛽 [𝔼 {(𝑉𝑡+1(𝓢
+))
1−𝛾
1−1 𝜓⁄ }]
1−1 𝜓⁄
1−𝛾
   (5) 591 
𝑠. 𝑡    𝐾+ = ( 1 − 𝛿)𝐾 + 𝑌𝑡( 𝐾, 𝑇
𝐴𝑇 , 𝑰, 𝑱 ) − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝛹𝑡   (6) 592 
𝑴+ =  𝚽𝑀𝑴 + ( ℇ𝑡( 𝐾, 𝜇), 0, 0)
⊤    (7) 593 
 𝑻+ =  𝚽𝑇𝑻 + (𝜉1ℱ𝑡 (𝑀
𝐴𝑇), 0)⊤    (8) 594 
𝐼𝑖
+ = 𝑔𝑖(𝑰, 𝑇
𝐴𝑇 , 𝜔𝑖)      (9) 595 
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    𝐽𝑖
+ = min{ 𝐽𝑖 + Δ𝑖, 𝐽𝑖}𝐼𝑖     (10) 596 
where 𝑉𝑡(𝓢) denotes the time 𝑡 value function which is endogenous in the 16-dimensional 597 
state vector denoted by 𝓢. Furthermore, 𝐶𝑡, 𝜇𝑡 are the control variables for consumption and 598 
mitigation. Each period’s utility 𝑢 depends on consumption and exogenous labour supply 𝐿𝑡. 599 
With 𝛽 we denote the utility discount rate. The expectation operator is over the next-period’s 600 
value function with 𝛾 and 𝜓 denoting the risk aversion parameter and the elasticity of inter-601 
temporal substitution, respectively. In our default parameter case, we follow the calibration 602 
by Pindyck & Wang
23
 and specify: 𝛾 = 3.066 and 𝜓 = 1.5. Furthermore, 𝐾, 𝑴 and 𝑻 denote 603 
the capital stock, the three carbon stocks and the two temperatures (𝑀𝐴𝑇 and 𝑇𝐴𝑇 represent 604 
carbon concentration and temperature in the atmosphere), respectively and a “+” superscript 605 
denotes a variable’s next period value. 𝑌𝑡 denotes world gross product net of damages and ℇ𝑡 606 
denotes non-mitigated emissions into the atmosphere. Finally Ψ𝑡  is the expenditure on 607 
mitigation, and ℱ𝑡 is a term related to radiative forcing.  The model is solved for the next 300 608 
years with a terminal value function approximating the welfare of future years from 301 to 609 
infinite horizon (see Supplementary Methods). Our SCC is computed via  610 
𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑡 = −1000(
𝜕𝑉𝑡
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝐴𝑇)/(
𝜕𝑉𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
) , 611 
as in DSICE
19
, denoting the marginal rate of substitution between atmospheric carbon 612 
concentration and capital.  613 
After solving the dynamic programming problem using parallel backward value function 614 
iteration
46
 (see Supplementary Methods), we use these approximated value functions 𝑉𝑡  to 615 
simulate 10,000 paths in the following way: at the initial time, its state vector 𝓢𝟎 is known as 616 
the observed market values, then we can get the optimal consumption and emission control 617 
rate at time 0 by solving the dynamic programming problem with the previously computed 618 
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𝑉1. Using sample realization of shocks, we can obtain the next state vector 𝓢𝟏; using the same 619 
method to iterate forward, we get one simulated path of states and optimal policies that 620 
depend on realization of shocks. Repeating this process, we get 10,000 sample paths for our 621 
analysis.  622 
 623 
Numerical Implementation of the Model 624 
We have found that for the relatively short time horizon, when recalibrating the carbon cycle 625 
and temperature modules to match all four RCP scenarios closely we can omit the deep ocean 626 
stock of carbon without any loss of accuracy in the carbon-to-temperature relationship. Thus, 627 
the numerical implementation of the model is fifteen-dimensional. The computational task 628 
required to solve this fifteen-dimensional problem goes far beyond what has previously been 629 
achieved in truly stochastic climate-economy models, where 3-4 dimensional problems are 630 
considered the current frontier. We solve the model with parallel dynamic programming 631 
methods
46
 on 312,500,000 approximation nodes for the 10-dimensional continuous state 632 
space and degree-4 complete Chebyshev polynomials for each of the 5 discrete state vectors. 633 
It takes about 3 hours to solve the model for a single set of parameter values on 10,560 cores 634 
at the Blue Waters supercomputer. The estimated error bound of the optimal solution is 0.1%-635 
1% for policy functions and 0.01%-0.1% for the value functions.  636 
 637 
Sensitivity analyses 638 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses. Firstly we varied the transition times and/or 639 
damages of all five tipping elements across their assigned uncertainty ranges. Secondly we 640 
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took a more pessimistic assessment of the interaction between the tipping elements 641 
(Supplementary Table 3), which uses the upper bounds of the core experts’ assessment.  642 
Thirdly, some more complex sensitivity studies were also conducted exploring the effect of 643 
endogenous transition times for tipping elements. In our model the transition time for tipping 644 
element 𝑖 is inversely tied to Δ𝑖,𝑡 , the annual damage increase during the transition phase. 645 
Thus, the transition time for element 𝑖 is proportional to 
1
Δ𝑖,𝑡
 and also its final damage level 𝐽𝑖. 646 
In the case of an endogenous transition time, we let the annual damage increase be Δ𝑖,𝑡 =647 
𝐽𝑖exp (𝑎𝑖𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 − 𝑏𝑖), where 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑏𝑖  are parameters calibrated to result in 𝐽𝑖/Δ𝑖,𝑡  to be the 648 
long transition time for 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 = 0 and short transition time for 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 = 6. Thus, the endogenous 649 
transition time is equal to ∫ exp (𝑎𝑖𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 − 𝑏𝑖)𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝐼_(𝐽𝑖,𝑡 < 𝐽?̅?)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
.  650 
As a general rule, transition timescales should be governed by the internal dynamical 651 
timescale(s) of the system in question, so it may not be appropriate to include a temperature 652 
dependence of the transition timescale for all tipping elements. However, endogenous 653 
transition times have some backing for the major ice sheets, where models
51,52
, show that the 654 
rate of ice sheet meltdown depends on the amount by which a temperature threshold is 655 
exceeded. 656 
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Supplementary Information:  701 
 702 
Supplementary Methods: Calibration for the Climate System 703 
The DSICE model used in this study is based on the DICE-2013R model where the carbon 704 
cycle and temperature modules are represented by a three-box and a two-box model 705 
respectively. DICE-2013R uses five-year time steps and its carbon cycle and temperature 706 
modules are calibrated with one RCP scenario. Our DSICE model instead uses annual time 707 
steps and four RCP scenarios (RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, RCP8.5) to calibrate the parameters 708 
in the carbon cycle and temperature modules. For each RCP emission scenario, MAGICC 709 
provides their corresponding scenarios of carbon concentration and temperature in the 710 
atmosphere. We use this information to calibrate the parameters in our carbon cycle and 711 
temperature modules.  712 
For each RCP emission scenario, we first use it as the input 𝐸𝑡 to the carbon cycle, and then it 713 
outputs a path of carbon concentration in the atmosphere via  714 
𝑴𝑡+1 =  Φ
𝑀𝑀𝑡 + (𝐸𝑡, 0, 0 )
⊤ 
with the carbon cycle transition matrix  715 
𝚽𝑀 =  [
1 − 𝜙12 𝜙12 0
𝜙12  1 − 𝜙21 − 𝜙23 𝜙32
 0  𝜙23  1 − 𝜙32 
] 
We calibrate the parameters in 𝚽𝑀 so that our generated paths of carbon concentration in the 716 
atmosphere match their corresponding RCP scenarios of carbon concentration in the 717 
atmosphere for all four RCP scenarios. Our numerical calibration shows that 𝜙23 and 𝜙32 are 718 
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nearly zero, so we drop the carbon concentration in the deep ocean in our numerical 719 
implementation, and find that it has almost no impact on the solutions. 720 
The carbon concentrations in the atmosphere generate radiative forcing: 721 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝜂 log2(𝑀
𝐴𝑇 𝑀∗
𝐴𝑇⁄ ) + 𝐹𝑡
𝐸𝑋, 722 
where 𝑀∗
𝐴𝑇 is the preindustrial carbon concentration in the atmosphere, and 𝐹𝑡
𝐸𝑋  is exogenous 723 
radiative forcing. The radiative forcing impacts the surface temperature. With our carbon 724 
concentration paths, we have their corresponding radiative forcing scenarios. Using each of 725 
them as the input to the temperature system  726 
𝐓𝑡+1 =  𝚽
⊤𝐓𝑡 + (ξ1𝐹𝑡 , 0)
⊤, 727 
with 728 
                                                   Φ𝑇 =  [
1 − 𝜑21 − 𝜉2 𝜑21
𝜑12 1 − 𝜑12
], 729 
we can generate one path of surface temperature. We calibrate the parameters ξ1, 𝜉2, 𝜑21, 𝜑12 730 
so that our generated paths of surface temperature match the corresponding RCP scenarios of 731 
surface temperature for all four RCP scenarios. 732 
  733 
Supplementary Methods: Economic System 734 
In the economic system of DSICE, our utility at period t is 735 
𝑢(𝐶𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) =  
(𝐶𝑡/𝐿𝑡)
1−1/𝜓
1−1/𝜓
 𝐿𝑡 , 736 
where 𝐶𝑡 is consumption, 𝜓 is IES (inter-temporal elasticity of substitution), and 𝐿𝑡 is 737 
population (in billions) given as  738 
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𝐿𝑡 = 6.838𝑒
−0.0254𝑡 + 10.5(1 − 𝑒−0.0254𝑡) 
The gross world output at year t is 739 
𝑌𝑡(𝐾𝑡, 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 , 𝑰𝑡, 𝑱𝑡) = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼Ω𝑡(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 , 𝑱𝒕, 𝑰𝒕) 
with 740 
Ω𝑡(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 , 𝑱𝒕, 𝑰𝒕) =
∏ (1 − 𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝐽𝑖,𝑡𝑖 )
1 + 𝜋2(𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇)
2 
defined in the main text. The mitigation expenditure is  741 
Ψ𝑡 = 𝜃1,𝑡𝜇𝑡
𝜃2𝑌𝑡(𝐾𝑡, 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 , 𝑰𝑡, 𝑱𝑡) 
Thus, the law of transition for capital 𝐾𝑡 is 742 
𝐾𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡(𝐾𝑡, 𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑇 , 𝑰𝑡, 𝑱𝑡) − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝛹𝑡 
The carbon emission from economic activity and land is  743 
ℇ𝑡(𝐾𝑡, 𝜇𝑡) =  𝜎𝑡( 1 − 𝜇𝑡)𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼 + 𝐸𝑡
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 
where 𝐸𝑡
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 is defined in the main text. The exogenous paths 𝐴𝑡, 𝜃1,𝑡, 𝜎𝑡, and the parameter 744 
values for 𝛼, 𝜋2, 𝜃2, 𝛿 follow DICE-2013R. 745 
 746 
Supplementary Methods: Terminal Value Function 747 
Welfare is usually defined over an infinite horizon, while DICE-2013R approximates it with 748 
a 300 years horizon for numerical implementation, as values after 300 years are discounted to 749 
be small. In the DSICE model, we use a terminal value function at the “terminal” time t=301 750 
to approximate the welfare after 300 years, for a more precise numerical implementation and 751 
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also a more stable value function iteration for solving the dynamic programming problem 752 
defined in the main text.  753 
To compute the terminal value function, we assume that the emission control rate will always 754 
be one after 300 years, and consumption will always be 0.74 share of gross world production. 755 
If one tipping element has been tipped before the terminal time, then its damage will keep 756 
unfolding, otherwise we assume it will never be tipped after the terminal time. We assume 757 
that all exogenous paths will stop changing after the terminal time. Under these assumptions, 758 
for any terminal state 𝓢, we can generate a flow of consumption after the terminal time, and 759 
then we estimate the value of the terminal value function at that state to be  760 
𝑉301(𝓢) = ∑ 𝑒
−𝜌(𝑡−301)𝑢(𝐶𝑡, 𝐿𝑡)
∞
𝑡=301
 
For the numerical implementation, we compute the above summation over 400 years (i.e., 761 
from year 301 to 700) as an approximation. Our numerical examples show that solutions for 762 
the first 200 years are insensitive to the choice of the terminal value function, due to the 763 
discounted effect inherent in the DICE-2013R model, but the terminal value function 764 
specified above is still essential because it enables us to have stable value function iteration. 765 
  766 
Supplementary Methods: The Numerical Algorithm 767 
We use parallel backward value function iteration
46
 to solve the dynamic programming 768 
problem (5)-(10). With the above defined terminal value function 𝑉301, for a state 𝓢 at time 769 
t=300, we use an optimization solver to solve the dynamic programming problem and then 770 
get 𝑉300(𝓢). Since this is a problem with both continuous and discrete state variables, we 771 
cannot compute 𝑉300(𝓢) for all possible states 𝓢. Instead we choose a set of approximation 772 
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state nodes 𝓢𝒊 and compute 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑉300(𝓢𝒊), and then use a complete Chebyshev polynomial to 773 
approximate the value function 𝑉300  at continuous state variables for each discrete state 774 
vector, so that 𝑣𝑖 ≈ 𝑉300(𝓢𝒊), but now we have a value of 𝑉300 at any state 𝓢. Note that these 775 
optimization problems are naturally parallelizable. Iterating backwards from t=300 to t=0, we 776 
get all value functions 𝑉𝑡 and also their corresponding policy functions. Using these value 777 
functions, we can then iterate forward to get one simulated path of optimal policies which 778 
depend on realization of the shocks, and repeat it to obtain 10,000 simulation paths, as 779 
described in the main text. See refs. 
19,46
 for more detailed discussion. 780 
 781 
 782 
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 788 
 789 
 790 
 791 
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Supplementary Tables 794 
 795 
Supplementary Table 1. Interaction terms between tipping events (𝑓𝑖𝑗), which describe by 796 
how much the hazard factor for tipping element 𝑗 is affected if tipping element 𝑖 has tipped.  797 
Tipping 
element i 
Tipping element j 
AMOC GIS WAIS AMAZ ENSO 
AMOC     -0.235 0.125 0.55 0.121 
GIS 1.62     0.378 0.108 0 
WAIS 0.107 0.246  0 0 
AMAZ 0 0 0  0 
ENSO -0.083 0 0.5 2.059  
 798 
 799 
Supplementary Table 2. Sensitivity analysis for simultaneously varying the transition times 800 
and damages of all five tipping elements. 801 
Social cost of carbon in 
2010 ($/tCO2) 
High damage Default damage Low damage 
Short transition time 166 145 94 
Default transition time 145 116 77 
Long transition time 75 62 50 
 802 
 803 
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Supplementary Table 3. Pessimistic assessment of the interaction terms between tipping 804 
events (𝑓𝑖𝑗) using the upper bounds of the core experts’ assessment. 805 
Tipping 
element i 
Tipping element j 
AMOC GIS WAIS AMAZ ENSO 
AMOC     -0.056 0.25 1 0.25 
GIS 3.04     0.68 0.2 0 
WAIS 0.44 0.483  0 0 
AMAZ 0 0 0  0 
ENSO 0.16 0 1 3.83  
 806 
 807 
  808 
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Supplementary Figures 809 
 810 
Supplementary Figure 1. Schematic of the DSICE model used in this study. The “deep 811 
ocean carbon” box is shaded as it can be omitted in the numerical analysis (see “Numerical 812 
Implementation of the Model” in the Methods section). 813 
 814 
 815 
Supplementary Figure 2. Schematic of the tipping process in the DSICE model. 816 
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 817 
Supplementary Figure 3. Results for: (a) the social cost of carbon, (b) emissions control 818 
policy, (c) atmospheric carbon (ppm), and (d) surface temperature change (above pre-819 
industrial), in the baseline deterministic model (green), the deterministic model with Epstein-820 
Zin preferences (blue), and the expected path of stochastic model with multiple tipping points 821 
(black) in case without interaction. The grey-shaded area shows the range of sample paths 822 
from 10,000 simulations of the stochastic model (see Figure 2 for the analogous case with 823 
interaction). 824 
 825 
Supplementary Figure 4. Example sample paths with two tipping events this century. 826 
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 827 
Supplementary Figure 5. Sample paths of the earliest (and sole) tipping of each element. 828 
 829 
 830 
Supplementary Figure 6. Sample emission paths of the earliest (and sole) tipping of each 831 
element. 832 
 833 
 834 
